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NOTES

SOLEM V. HELM:
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF
RECIDIVIST SENTENCING IS REQUIRED BY
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted."' In construing the cruel and unusual
punishments clause, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized
that a punishment should be proportional to the crime for which it is
imposed. 2 Recently, in Solem v. Helm, 3 the Court applied this principle of
proportionality to the length of a prison sentence imposed under a recidivist
statute.' The Helm Court announced a three-part test for determining whether
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. The principle of proportionality is derived from the theory of retribution. W. LAFAVE
& A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 24 (1972). Retribution is the oldest of the six generally recognized
theories of punishment, which include prevention, isolation, rehabilitation, deterrence of others,
and public education. Id. at 22-24. Under the retributive theory, an offender is punished because
he deserves punishment. Id. at 24. Opponents of the retributive theory characterize it as mere
revenge or retaliation. Id. Supporters of retribution maintain that punishment restores the victim's peace of mind and balances the harm caused by the offender's criminal act. Id.
The corollary of retribution is proportionality. See Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of
Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Disproportionality]. An offender deserves some punishment, but this principle requires that the punishment be commensurate with the crime. Id. The ancient law recognized the principle of proportionality: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Under the proportionality theory, the most
severe punishments must be reserved for the most grievous offenses, lest an offender be punished
more than he deserves.
Some commentators urge that utilitarian justifications of punishment, such as rehabilitation
of past offenders, isolation of criminals to protect society, and deterrence of potential wrongdoers,
are incompatible with the principle of proportionality. Id. Under this principle, the moral gravity
of the offense determines the severity of punishment. Id. at 1121-22. Thus, an individual convicted of manslaughter would be punished much more severely than a first-time shoplifter.
Id. A shoplifter incarcerated until he is judged to be rehabilitated, however, may serve a sentence
longer than that of the individual convicted of manslaughter, if it is determined that the shoplifter
cannot be rehabilitated as quickly. Id. at 1122. Similarly, imposing longer sentences on firstoffender shoplifters than on those convicted of manslaughter might be justified on the utilitarian
grounds that shoplifting is more difficult to deter and that shoplifters are more likely to be
repeat offenders and thus need to be isolated from society. Id.
3. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
4. A recidivist statute authorizes enhanced punishment for an offender who previously
has been convicted of another crime or crimes. The enhanced punishment is imposed because
of these previous convictions, not because of any circumstances of the principal, or most recent, offense. The enhanced punishment may be imposed either instead of, or in addition to,
punishment otherwise authorized for the most recent offense. Under some recidivist statutes,

DEPA UL LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 33:149

a prison sentence is disproportionate. Under that test, reviewing courts must
consider the gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty, the penalties
imposed in the same jurisdiction for other crimes, and the penalties imposed
in other jurisdictions for the same offense.' The Helm Court, however,
overlooked several potential difficulties in applying the test. Furthermore,
the Helm decision is marred by ambiguities and internal inconsistencies.
Focusing on Helm, this Note reviews the Supreme Court's development
of the proportionality concept. Although the Helm decision provides lower
courts with some guidelines for analyzing eighth amendment challenges, an
examination of the Helm Court's own application of these criteria shows
that the guidelines are riddled with confusion. As a result, this Note suggests that the constitutionality of most state recidivist statutes is now suspect.
Until the Court resolves the ambiguities and inconsistencies of the Helm
analysis, the three-part test will be of limited usefulness.
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND PROPORTIONALITY
IN THE SUPREME COURT

Exactly what the framers intended by the phrase "cruel and unusual
punishments" has been a matter of lively debate. 6 The Supreme Court first
the offender must have been convicted of several previous crimes; other statutes permit enhanced
punishment upon a second conviction. When several convictions are required to trigger the
statute, typically a court must determine if the person is an habitual offender. See infra Statutory
Appendix, which lists the recidivist statutes currently in effect in various jurisdictions and describes
their essential characteristics. As used in this Note, the term "recidivist statute" refers to a criminal
statute that permits a sentencing court to consider any prior convictions and to impose enhanced
punishment for the most recent offense because of those prior convictions.
5. 103 S. Ct. at 3010-11.
6. There are two prevailing views of the framers' intent. Some writers have argued that
the cruel and unusual punishments clause prohibits only torture and barbaric forms of punishment. Members of the Court have occasionally asserted this view. Other writers have maintained that, while barbarous punishments may have been the framers' primary concern, the cruel
and unusual punishments clause was meant to go farther and ban all punishments that are
excessive in relation to the particular crime. This view has been endorsed by the Court on
several occasions.
The language of the eighth amendment is identical to a provision of the 1689 English Bill
of Rights. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3007. Some commentators have argued that the framers of
the eighth amendment used identical words because they intended the eighth amendment to
provide the same protection against governmental oppression as was provided by its English
counterpart. Id.; Note, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical
Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L.
REV. 783, 788 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Eighth Amendment]; Note, The Effectiveness
of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 846, 846-47 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Note, Effectiveness]. Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear what the English meant by their proscription. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 242-45 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 274 & nn.16-17 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 316-19 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 376-77 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The English
Bill of Rights was enacted shortly after the Bloody Assizes and the perjury trial of Titus Oates.
See Note, Effectiveness, supra, at 788. Historians have, therefore, interpreted the Bill of Rights
as Parliament's reaction to these monarchical abuses. See Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
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held that disproportionate punishments were proscribed by the eighth
amendment in Weems v. United States.' Weems, a disbursing officer in the
378 (1980); Note, Eighth Amendment, supra; Note, Effectiveness, supra. Some
writers have contended that the English cruel and unusual punishments provision banned only
those penalties not authorized by Parliament. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 376 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Granucdi, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning,
57 CALIF. L. REv. 839, 852-60 (1969). Others have argued that the provision also banned barbarous punishments. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 389-90 (1910) (White,
J., dissenting); Note, Effectiveness, supra, at 847. Some English courts apparently interpreted
the provision as simply enacting the common law requirement of proportionality between
punishments and crimes. See Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3006-07.
A number of commentators have suggested that the English interpretation of cruel and unusual
punishment is only part of the meaning the framers attached to that phrase. See, e.g., Note,
Eighth Amendment, supra, at 808-19. The drafters of the eighth amendment were also influenced
by the writings of Enlightenment philosophers, such as Cesare Beccaria, who advocated a "just
proportion" between the crime committed and the severity of punishment. Id. According to
many observers, the principle of proportionality was incorporated into the eighth amendment,
See, e.g., Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3007; Note, Eighth Amendment, supra, at 808-30.
The Court, however, has not always limited itself to the framers' intent when interpreting
and applying the cruel and unusual punishments clause. See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text. A number of decisions have indicated that the meaning of the eighth amendment
is flexible and depends upon the prevailing views of contemporary society. See, e.g., Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (eighth amendment draws its meaning "from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910 (eighth amendment acquires meaning as "public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice").
7. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Court rejected earlier challenges under the cruel and unusual
punishments clause but intimated that proportionality was incorporated in the eighth amendment. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-36 (1878); Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 475, 480 (1867). In Pervear v. Commonwealth, Pervear was convicted by a state
court for illegally selling intoxicating liquors and was sentenced to three months imprisonment
at hard labor and a $50 fine. Pervear challenged the conviction on the grounds that, inter
alia, the punishment imposed was cruel, excessive, and unusual and, thus, violated the eighth
amendment. Id. at 476. The Court rejected this challenge, holding that the eighth amendment
did not apply to the states. Id. at 479-80. Nevertheless, the Pervear Court indicated that even
if the eighth amendment was applicable, the penalty would not have violated the cruel and
unusual punishments clause. Id. at 480. A valid state interest, protecting the community, justified
the punishment. Furthermore, the penalty was "the usual mode adopted in many, perhaps,
all of the States." Id.
In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced
to public execution by firing squad. Employing a proportionality analysis, the Court upheld
the penalty. Execution by firing squad was a widely accepted mode of inflicting the death
penalty and was common in the military. Id. at 134-35. The punishment, therefore, could be
labeled neither cruel nor unusual. Id.
In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), the Court again dismissed an appeal, on eighth
amendment grounds, from a sentence of fine and imprisonment. The majority held that it
lacked jurisdiction because no federal question was presented. Id. at 331-32. In a powerful
dissent, Justice Field argued that the eighth amendment was applicable and prohibited the punishment imposed. Id. at 339-41. The defendant, O'Neil, was convicted of 307 counts of selling
liquor without authority and was fined $20 plus court costs for each offense. If the fine and
costs were not paid, O'Neil was required to serve three days in prison for each dollar fined
(more than 54 years). Id. at 330. Justice Field maintained that the cruel and unusual punishments
clause prohibited "all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." Id. at 339-40. Because this punishment was far greater than
any that would have been imposed for manslaughter or other serious crimes, Justice Field conCRIMINOLOGY
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Philippines, was convicted of making two false entries in cash books he kept
for the United States government.' He was fined 4,000 pesetas, sentenced
to fifteen years imprisonment under exceptionally harsh conditions, and
deprived of political and personal rights after release from prison.' The
Weems Court premised its holding on the precept that a punishment should
be proportional to the offense for which it is imposed.'" Considering the
fine, imprisonment, and accessory penalties as a whole, the Court concluded
that the entire sentence violated the eighth amendment.'
After establishing a broad power of judicial review of sentencing statutes
in Weems,' 2 the Court did not invalidate another sentence as cruel and
unusual for nearly sixty years. In Trop v. Dulles,'I the defendant was convicted of wartime desertion and dishonorably discharged." Under a provision of the Nationality Act,'" persons dishonorably discharged under such
circumstances lost both the rights of citizenship and citizenship itself."6 In
determining the constitutionality of that provision, the Trop Court relied
on the Weems proportionality principle. Evaluating the proportionality of
Trop's penalty, the Court acknowledged that desertion was one of the most
cluded that it was unconstitutionally severe. Id. at 339-41. The O'Neil dissent's interpretation
of the eighth amendment was later adopted by the Court in Weems. See Weems v, United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
8. 217 U.S. at 357-58. Under the criminal statute involved, no fraudulent intent was required.
Id. at 363. Proof that a false entry was knowingly made was a sufficient basis for conviction. Id.
9. The punishment imposed, cadena temporal, came from the Spanish civil law and was
unknown in the United States. Id. at 363-64. Only cadena perpetua (same punishment for life)
and death were more severe. Id. Those sentenced to cadena were required to carry a chain
from the wrists and ankle, were put to hard and painful labor during imprisonment, and were
forbidden outside assistance while confined. Id. at 364. After release from prison, "accessory
penalties" were imposed: civil interdiction (deprivation of many personal rights), perpetual absolute disqualification (deprivation of rights to vote and hold public office), and surveillance
for life. Id. at 364-65.
10. Id. at 367.
11. Id. at 382. Because the various penalties were not considered separately, it is unclear
which were cruel and unusual. The Helm dissent asserted that the Weems holding was based
on all the facts, rather than on a finding of disproportionality. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3018 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); see also Schwartz, supra note 6, at 385 (the Weems holding is most reasonably
interpreted as based upon the combination of all the penalties). The Weems Court nevertheless
indicated that the eighth amendment was intended as a limitation on legislative power to fix
terms of imprisonment. 217 U.S. at 372-73.
12. The Weems Court explicitly limited its decision to sentences imposed by statute, not
by courts. 217 U.S. at 377.
13. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
14. Id. at 87-88. Trop escaped from a stockade where he had been confined for breach
of discipline. The next day he headed back toward his base and willingly surrendered to an
Army officer who happened to drive past Trop. Id.
15. Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1976) (repealed 1978).
16. 356 U.S. at 89. Persons convicted of serious crimes commonly lose certain civil rights,
such as the right to hold public office, for the period of their incarceration. The accessory
penalties imposed in Weems were arguably little more than an extension of this customary
loss of rights. In Trop, however, the punishment imposed was a step beyond loss of civil rights.
An expatriate is not entitled to the protection of any nation and has no "right to have rights"
anywhere. Id. at 101-02.

1983]

SOLEM v. HELM

153

serious crimes in military law.' 7 Although military tribunals were authorized
to impose the death penalty for wartime desertion, Trop had merely been
dishonorably discharged.' 8 Declaring that the government has unlimited discretion in imposing penalties short of death, 9 the Trop majority compared the
nationality laws of foreign nations and found that denationalization was not
permitted by civilized countries as punishment for a crime.2" Accordingly,
the Court concluded that denationalization was an unusually severe punishment both in an absolute sense and by comparison with contemporary international standards; therefore, it was held unconstitutional. 2 '
Subsequently, in Robinson v. California,22 the Court held that the eighth
amendment limited the ability of states to define crimes and impose
penalties.2 3 For the next several years, the Court's scrutiny of proportionality focused primarily on the states' imposition of the death penalty.
Although the death penalty was not a disproportionate punishment for
murder,2" the Court determined that it was unconstitutionally excessive when
imposed for rape not involving danger to human life.2"
17. Id. at 90.
18. Id. at 99. As a result of his desertion, Trop was court-martialed, dishonorably discharged,
and he lost his citizenship. Id. at 89-90. Thus, denationalization was an additional penalty
imposed under civilian, rather than military, law. Id.
19. Id. at 99.
20. Id. at 102. The Trop dissent disagreed: "Many civilized nations impose loss of citizenship for indulgence in designated prohibited activities. . . . Some countries have made wartime
desertion result in loss of citizenship.
Id. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 102-03.
22. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
23. Id. at 666-67. Robinson had been convicted under a California statute which made it
a crime to "be addicted to the use of narcotics." Id. at 660-61. The Court held that the statute
violated the eighth amendment because it punished status, rather than conduct. Id. at 666.
24. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). The plurality stated that
"we cannot say that the punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes." Id. at 187; see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion) (state cannot make death sentence mandatory);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory death sentence
is unconstitutional, even for first-degree murder); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion) (procedure requiring jury to answer special interrogatories before imposing death
sentence is valid); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion) (judges may weigh
aggravating and mitigating factors in determining whether death penalty shall be imposed).
The Court has recently ruled that the eighth amendment does not require a state appellate
court to apply a proportionality analysis before affirming a death sentence. Pulley v. Harris,
104 S. Ct. 871, 879-80 (1984).
25. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). Relying upon Gregg, the Coker Court
articulated a two-part test for determining whether a punishment is excessive. Under this test,
a sentence is unconstitutional if it fails to contribute to the goals of punishment and is, therefore,
merely a purposeless imposition of sufferings, or if it is grossly out of proportion to the crime.
Proportionality is to be measured, for the purposes of this test, by reviewing public attitudes,
history and precedent, legislative opinions, and prior jury sentences. Id. at 592; see also Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) (death sentence held an unconstitutional penalty for
felony murder when defendant did not himself kill or attempt to kill the victim or intend that
a killing take place).
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Although the eighth amendment requires punishments to be proportional
to the crimes for which they are imposed, the Court had never invalidated
a sentence of imprisonment solely because its length was excessive.26 In the
past three years, however, the Supreme Court has decided three cases involving allegedly disproportionate prison sentences. 2' The first case, Rummel v. Estelle,28 concerned the constitutionality of a recidivist statute. Rummel had been convicted of three felonies, each involving small amounts of
property obtained by fraud,2 9 and he was sentenced to life imprisonment"
as authorized by the Texas recidivist statute.' Rummel appealed the sentence,
arguing that it was "grossly disproportionate" to the punishment he would
have received for each of the three felonies.3 2 Although the Rummel Court
distinguished other eighth amendment precedents as involving punishments
"different in kind" from imprisonment, 33 it used a proportionality analysis
to uphold the sentence. The Court reasoned that the life sentence simply
could not be compared to the typical sentence that would be imposed for
the fraudulent acquisition of property, because the state had a valid interest
in imposing harsher sentences on offenders who, by repeatedly breaking the
law, had clearly demonstrated an inability to conform to society's norms. 34

26. Defendants appealing their lengthy sentences have met with more success in state and
lower federal courts than in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th
Cir. 1973) (mandatory life sentence which was imposed under state recidivist statute held
disproportionate to defendant's three minor offenses), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); Thacker
v. Garrison, 445 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.N.C. 1978) (48-50 years sentence held disproportionate
punishment for safecracking); People v. Brown, 90 I1. App. 3d 742, 414 N.E.2d 475 (3d Dist.
1980) (four years imprisonment disproportionate to crime of attempted burglary, given defendant's rehabilitative potential); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972)
(sentence of 20 years imprisonment for sale of marijuana held excessive, when the goal of
punishment is rehabilitation and the court failed to consider defendant's personality and history);
People v. Lewis, 113 Misc. 2d 1091, 450 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1982) 1(reclassification of punishment
for daytime burglary of dwelling was held greatly disproportionate to the offense).
27. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
28. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Applying the proportionality analysis is somewhat more complicated
when a defendant is sentenced under a recidivist statute. The sentence is imposed for the prior
offenses as well as the most recent crime. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
29. In 1964, Rummel was convicted of fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth
of goods or services. 445 U.S. at 265. Because the value of the items exceeded $50, the offense
was a felony under Texas law. Id. In 1969, Rummel was convicted of passing a forged check
in the amount of $28.36. Id. In 1973 Rummel was charged with obtaining $120.75 by false
pretenses. Id. at 266.
30. Rummel would have been eligible for parole in as little as 12 years. Id. at 280. Under
the Texas parole system, it was not likely that Rummel would have spent the rest of his life
in prison. Id. at 280-81.
31. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (Vernon 1974). For a description of the Texas recidivist
statute, see infra Statutory Appendix.
32. 445 U.S. at 265.
33. Id. at 272-75.
34. Id. at 276.
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According to the Court, when considered in light of this state interest, Rummel's sentence was not disproportionate to his crimes."
Although the Rummel Court indicated that proportionality requirements
did not constrain the length of prison sentences, 36 a proportionality analysis
was used to justify Rummel's sentence. As a result, some lower courts continued to require that the length of a prison term be proportional to the
crime for which it was imposed.3" Consequently, in Hutto v. Davis,38 the
Supreme Court declared that "federal courts should be 'reluctan[t] to review
legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment,' . . . and . . . 'successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare.' ",9 The Davis Court read Rummel as having "implicitly disapproved" the proportionality analysis used by the district court in Davis.40
The dissenting Justices thought this reading of Rummel was too broad. 4 1
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, asserted that Rummel's sentence
was justified by the state's interest in deterring and isolating recidivists.4 2
Because Davis was not sentenced under a recidivist statute, Justice Brennan
43
reasoned that Rummel was not controlling.
THE HELM DECISION

In 1979, Jerry Buckley Helm was convicted of issuing a "no account"
check, a felony in South Dakota."' For a first offender, the maximum penalty
was five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.4 5 Helm, however, had been

35. Id. at 284-85.
36. The Court cautioned that, in comparing prison sentences of varying lengths, "the lines

to be drawn are indeed 'subjective,' and therefore properly within the province of legislatures,
not courts." Id. at 275-76. Nevertheless, the Rummel majority conceded that a proportionality
analysis would be appropriate in extreme situations when the criminal statute was facially unconstitutional, such as "if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment." Id. at 274 n.ll.
37. See, e.g., Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1980) (interpreting Rummel as endorsing the application of proportionality to sentence length); Davis v. Davis, 601
F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979) (applying the same proportionality test both before and after Rummel), vacated sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980).

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

454
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S. 370 (1982).
at 374 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272, 274) (brackets in original).
at 373 & n.2.
at 382-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
(Brennan, J., dissenting).

44. The relevant statute provided:

Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not
have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a Class 5 felony.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

§ 22-41-1.2 (1979).

45. Id. § 22-6-1(6) (1979).
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previously convicted of six other felonies" and, therefore, was subject to
South Dakota's recidivist statute."7 Helm was sentenced to life imprisonment
without possibility of parole.

8

Helm appealed his sentence on the ground that it violated the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause. 9 The South Dakota Supreme
Court rejected Helm's challenge and affirmed his sentence."0 Helm later requested the governor to commute his sentence to a term of years,' but
his request was denied.

2

Subsequently, Helm petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for South Dakota.

3

Once again, Helm contended that

his sentence violated the cruel and unusual punishments clause because it
was disproportionate to the crimes for which he had been convicted." ' The
district court concluded that Rummel was controlling and, thus, Helm could
not challenge the length of his sentence."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and

remanded. 4 The appellate court held that Rummel was not controlling and
declared that a proportionality analysis was applicable." The court reasoned that Helm's life sentence was qualitatively different from Rummel's
because, while Rummel would have been eligible for parole in a few years, 5"
Helm would spend the rest of his life in prison." Applying a proportionality analysis, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Helm's sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offense.60 Subsequently, a petition for certiorari
was granted by the United States Supreme Court."

46. In 1964, 1966, and 1969, Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 103 S. Ct. at
3004. In 1972, he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. In 1973, Helm
was convicted of grand larceny. Finally, in 1975, Helm was convicted of third-offense driving
while intoxicated. Id.
47. South Dakota's recidivist statute provided, "When a defendant has been convicted of
at least three prior convictions in addition to the principal felony, the sentence for the principal
felony shall be enhanced to the sentence for a Class I felony." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended in 1981 to substitute "three prior felony convictions" for "three
prior convictions").
48. 103 S. Ct. at 3006. The maximum penalty authorized by South Dakota for Class 1
felonies is life imprisonment and a $25,000 fine. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-6-1(3) (1979
& Supp. 1983). South Dakota law provides that "[a] person sentenced to life imprisonment
is not eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." Id. § 24-15-4 (1979).
49. State v. Helm, S.D. __ , 287 N.W.2d 497 (1980).
50. Id. The Court also rejected Helm's arguments that his sentence was an abuse of discretion and a denial of due process of law. Id.
51. 103 S. Ct. at 3006.
52. Id.
53. Helm v. Solem, No. CIV81-5148 (D.S.D. Dec. 12, 1981).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982).
57. Id. at 585-86.
58. Id. at 584.
59. Id. at 585.
60. Id.at. 587.
61. 103 S. Ct. 339 (1982).
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In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision. 6" The Court initially examined the history of the cruel and
unusual punishments clause,63 noting that its language was drawn from the
English Bill of Rights and Magna Carta, which English courts had interpreted as prohibiting excessive punishments of all kinds, including
imprisonment."' After examining the framers' intent, the Court concluded
that whether or not the cruel and unusual punishments clause was meant
to be broader than its English sources, the framers surely intended to
guarantee "at least the same protection. "' 65' The Court emphasized that the
66
eighth amendment itself provided no explicit exception for imprisonment
and concluded that the amendment incorporated the common law prohibi67
tion against any excessive punishment.
The Helm Court provided objective criteria in the form of a three-part
test, 68 for determining whether a punishment is unconstitutionally excessive
and disproportionate to a crime.61 Under this test, a court must first balance
the gravity of the offense against the harshness of the penalty.7" Next, a
court should compare the sentence imposed on offenders convicted of similar
crimes in the same jurisdiction. 7' Finally, the appellant's sentence must be
compared with the sentences imposed in other jurisdictions on those convicted of the same crime. 72
Before the Court applied this three-part test to the facts presented in Helm,
it narrowly defined Helm's offense. Helm had been charged both with issuing
a "no account" check and with being an habitual offender. 73 The Court
recognized that the prior felony convictions were "relevant to the sentenc'
but the majority characterized those offenses as nonviolent
ing decision," 74
and relatively minor.75 Instead of considering Helm's criminal record as a
62. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger dissented, joined by Justices
White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Only Justice Blackmun was in the majority in both Rummel
and Helm.
63. Id. at 3006-10.
64. Id. at 3006-07.
65. Id. at 3007.
66. Id. at 3009.
67. Id. at 3007.
68. Although it seems that the criteria are to be considered as a whole, the Court applied
them step by step. Id. at 3012-15; see infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
69. 103 S. Ct. at 3010.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the dissent, maintained that the criteria provided
by the majority were not truly objective. Id. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). According to
the Chief Justice, "What the Court means is that a sentence is unconstitutional if it is more
severe than five justices think appropriate." Id. Before Helm, however, the standard used was
even more subjective: the cruel and unusual punishments clause was not violated unless a punishment was so excessive that it "shocked the conscience." See irnfra note 101.
73. 103 S. Ct. at 3005.
74. Id. at 3013 n.21.
75. Id. at 3013. A crime can be both nonviolent and serious. See infra text accompanying
notes 170-71. Nevertheless, the majority apparently equated "relatively minor" with "nonviolent."
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whole, the Court focused on "the principal felony-the felony that triggered

the life sentence-since Helm ha[d] already paid the penalty for each of his
prior offenses. ''76
Having narrowly defined Helm's crime, the Court applied its test." The

majority found that society generally recognized issuance of a "no account"
check as "among the less serious offenses.1 7 Nevertheless, the sentence im-

posed on Helm was the harshest sanction authorized by the South Dakota
legislature.7 9 The Court then compared Helm's sentence to the sentences
authorized in South Dakota for other crimes." This comparison revealed
that life imprisonment without parole could be imposed for only a few very

serious felonies;' life sentences could not be imposed for any other crimes,
including many violent crimes, unless a defendant was subject to the recidivist
statute. 2 The majority therefore concluded that Helm's sentence was equal
to, or harsher than, sentences imposed on those convicted of much more
serious crimes.8 3 Finally, the Court compared the various states' recidivist
statutes, and determined that only one other state authorized life imprison-

ment without parole for Helm's offenses.8

'

After applying its three-part analysis, the Helm Court distinguished Rummel on the basis of eligibility for parole.8" The state had argued that although
South Dakota did not authorize parole for life sentences, such prison terms
could be shortened if commuted by the governor.8 " The majority emphasized
that commutation was significantly different from parole, 7 and determined
The majority labeled Helm's prior offenses as minor because "[his record involve[d] no instance of violence of any kind." 103 S. Ct. at 3013 n.22. The Court also appeared to equate
serious crimes with crimes against persons, i. at 3013, and at no point did it raise the possibility
that other kinds of crimes might also be considered serious.
76. 103 S. Ct. at 3013 n.21.
77. Id.at 3012-15.
78. Id. at 3013.
79. Id. Capital punishment is not authorized in South Dakota. Id.
80. Id.at 3013-14.
81. Id.at 3014. Life imprisonment was authorized for murder, treason, first-degree
manslaughter, first-degree arson, and kidnapping. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.

84. Id. at 3014-15. Only Nevada authorizes life imprisonment for commission of the particular offenses for which Helm had been convicted. NEV. REv. STAT. § 207.010 (1981). Neither
Nevada nor South Dakota makes a life sentence mandatory. 103 S. Ct. at 3014-15. In addition,
the Court noted that no defendant convicted under the Nevada recidivist statute had received
a life sentence. Id. at 3014.
85. 103 S. Ct. at 3013, 3015-16 & n.32. The dissent maintained that the facts of the two cases
were very similar. Id. at 3017-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the majority observed
that its conclusion in Helm was "not inconsistent" with Rummel. Id. at 3016 n.32.
86. Id.at 3015.
87. Id. The Helm Court noted that South Dakota had not commuted a life sentence in
more than eight years and that Helm had already been denied commutation. Id. at 3016 &
n.29. Furthermore, if Helm's sentence were commuted, he would simply be eligible for parole;
he would not be released. Id. at 3016. The Court concluded that the possibility of commutation of a sentence was "nothing more than a hope for 'an ad hoc exercise of clemency.' " Id.
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that the possibility of executive clemency did not mitigate the severity of
Helm's sentence."8 Concluding that the sentence was "significantly disproportionate" to Helm's crime, the Court held that the punishment violated the
eighth amendment.8 9
The Helm dissent objected to the majority's interpretation of eighth amendment precedent, particularly Rummel.9" According to the dissent, the eighth
amendment had previously restricted only the manner in which punishment
could be imposed and not the length of a prison sentence. 9' This traditional
focus on the mode of punishment was, in the dissent's view, a more practicable test than the majority's three-part analysis. 92 The dissent further contended that attempts by courts to balance the severity of crimes and the
harshness of penalties would necessarily result in improper judicial interference with matters of legislative discretion.93 To support this contention, the dissent stated that "Hutto [v. Davis] makes crystal clear that under
Rummel it is error for appellate courts to second-guess legislatures as to
whether a given sentence of imprisonment is excessive in relation to the
crime. . . ."" Furthermore, according to the dissent, comparisons between
recidivist statutes of different jurisdictions would "trample on fundamental
concepts of federalism"" and would lead to judicially imposed uniformity."
Finally, the dissent viewed the majority's holding as being overly broad
because it could permit every person convicted and sentenced to prison to
appeal on eighth amendment grounds.97
Parole, on the other hand, was "the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases." Id.
at 3015.
88. Id. at 3016. The underlying assumption of the state's argument was that the possibility
of parole mitigated the severity of a prison sentence. Id. at 3015. This proposition was not
contradicted by the Helm Court. See id. at 3015-16. Indeed, it can be argued that the Court's
refusal to overrule Rummel implies that the proposition was accepted as true.
89. Id. at 3016.
90. Id. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent found no fundamental difference
between parole and commutation. Id. at 3023 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger
asserted that Rummel was indistinguishable from Helm, and, therefore, a "decent regard" for
stare decisis required that Rummel be followed or explicitly overruled. Id. at 3021 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). The dissent also objected to the majority's characterization of Helm's offenses
as nonviolent, and opined that "[bly comparison, Rummel was a relatively 'model citizen.'
Id. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 3021 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent contended that Weems, and other
decisions invalidating sentences under the eighth amendment, had involved punishments that
differed in kind from imprisonment. Id. at 3018 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). According to the
dissent, the Court had consistently refused to extend the Weems excessive punishment doctrine
to a punishment consisting solely of imprisonment. Id. at 3021 n.6 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The dissent, therefore, concluded that the actual length of a prison term was of no constitutional significance provided that imprisonment would be an appropriate punishment. Id. at
3021 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 3022 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 3020 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
96. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282).
97. Id. at 3022 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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AND CRITICISM

The Helm decision explicitly adopts a three-part proportionality analysis
which has been employed by some lower federal and state courts for several
years;98 prior Supreme Court opinions only implicitly approved such an
analysis. 9 Under this approach, courts are directed to consider the gravity
of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, the sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and the sentences imposed for the
same crime in other jurisdictions. ' It must be noted, however, that several
problems with the three-part test and its application remain unresolved.
The Three-Part Proportionality Test
Because it provides specific, objective criteria, the proportionality analysis
announced in Helm is preferable to the "shock the conscience" standard
previously used by most courts in deciding eighth amendment challenges.' 0 '
98. Id. at 3010-11; see supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. One of the first cases
to use a test similar to the one adopted in Helm was Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 983 (1974). The Hart court employed a four-part test, which
contained the three factors delineated in Helm. Id. at 140-41. The Hart court also included
the legislative purpose underlying the punishment as a necessary consideration. Id. at 141. Not
all courts applying a proportionality analysis have adopted the legislative purpose prong of
the Hart test. See, e.g., Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1980) (requiring
the district court to apply the three-part test to determine whether life sentence for distributing
heroin was disproportionate); Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978) (three-part test
employed; sentences of 4 years to life and 6 years to life for drug felonies not disproportionate); State v. Mulalley, 127 Ariz. 92, 618 P.2d 586 (1980) (three-part test applied; life sentence
not disproportionate to crime of deadly assault); People v. Karsai, 131 Cal. App. 3d 224, 182
Cal. Rptr. 406 (1982) (three-part test is appropriate standard; sentence upheld); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972) (three-part test employed to invalidate sentence
of 20 years imprisonment for selling marijuana).
Indeed, it has been argued that the principle of proportionality is irrelevant if the sole justification for punishment is its usefulness in attaining a legislature's penological goals. See Note,
Disproportionality,supra note 2, at 1146. For example, even a sentence of life imprisonment
for a parking violation-could be justified on the basis of the legislative purpose of deterring
others from illegal parking, although such a punishment would clearly be disproportionate.
See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.ll (1980). The Supreme Court, therefore, considers legislative purpose separately from proportionality. The court has held that the eighth
amendment proscribes two types of excessive punishments: "[A] punishment is 'excessive' and
unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment
and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering;
or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977).
99. The Court, in Weems and Trop, applied portions of the test without explicitly requiring
the three-part analysis. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (punishment of denationalization compared with punishment imposed in other nations); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 380 (1910) (punishment imposed on defendant compared with penalties imposed for more
serious crimes).
100. 103 S. Ct. at 3010-11.
101. Before Helm, courts generally found the length of a prison sentence in violation of
the eighth amendment only if the sentence was so excessive as to "shock the conscience."
See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.1l (1980) (only in an extreme example, such
as life imprisonment for overtime parking, would proportionality come into play); Cepulonis
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Yet, the criteria that constitute the first prong of the test are inadequately
defined. Further, it is not entirely clear whether each prong is an independent requirement, or whether all three prongs should be considered collectively in determining whether a punishment is unconstitutionally disproportionate. If courts are to make objective decisions, however, the latter interpretation of Helm seems more reasonable.
Balancing the gravity of the offense against the harshness of the penalty
is the first step in the Helm Court's eighth amendment analysis. , Although
this initial step is the crux of any proportionality analysis, the majority's
approach to measuring both the gravity of the offense and the harshness
of the penalty is inadequate. The Helm Court recognized that the gravity
of an offense could be measured in terms of either the harm caused or
threatened to the victim or society, or the culpability of the offender.103
According to the majority, the gravity of the harm is measured by comparing the crime committed with other crimes.104 Harm may be immediate and
limited, such as a robbery victim's loss of property, or it may be continuing
in its impact on society as a whole, such as a sale of narcotics that is part
of a larger pattern of crime.
A court also may look to the offender's moral blameworthiness in measuring the gravity of the offense. The Helm Court noted that a defendant's
motive or mental state may be relevant in fixing appropriate punishment.' 5
A person who committed premeditated murder would deserve greater punishv. Commonwealth, __
Mass. _
, -,
427 N.E.2d 17, 20 (1981) (recognizing that
imprisonment could be disproportionate solely on the basis of length if so excessive as to shock
the conscience); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 181, 194 N.W.2d 827, 834 (1972) (holding
that 20 years imprisonment for sale of marijuana was "so excessive that it 'shocks the conscience' "). But see supra note 98 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts using the
three-part test prior to the Helm decision. Since this "shock the conscience" standard does
not require a court to specify any objective basis for its decision, Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3016
n.32, it is more subjective than the Helm test. It is, therefore, puzzling that the Helm dissent
would prefer this traditional standard, see id. at 3020 n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), to the
criteria established by the majority. The fact that courts have specific criteria upon which to
base eighth amendment decisions is not, in and of itself, likely to result in more appellate
court reversals of sentences. See id. at 3009 (challenges to the proportionality of particular
sentences rarely succeed); People v. Karsai, 131 Cal. App. 3d 224, 241, 182 Cal. Rptr. 406,
416-17 (1982) (the three-part test simply determines whether the punishment shocks the conscience).
102. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3010.
103. Id. at 3011. The second consideration focuses on the offender, rather than the offense.
It appears that the Helm Court considered both measures. While the Court focused primarily
on Helm's offenses, it also noted that Helm was an alcoholic, but "not a professional criminal."
Id. at 3013 n.22. The Court relied partially on these facts in determining that Helm's crimes
were "relatively minor." Id. at 3013. Other courts have considered the criminal's potential
for rehabilitation in evaluating whether the sentence imposed furthered the public policy underlying
criminal punishment. See People v. Brown, 90 11. App. 3d 742, 751, 414 N.E.2d 475, 482
(3d Dist. 1980); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 179-80, 194 N.W.2d 827, 832 (1972).
104. 103 S. Ct. at 3011. The Court observed that crimes against persons were generally accepted
as more serious than property crimes, that violent crimes were more serious than nonviolent
crimes, that greater offenses were more serious than lesser included offenses, and so forth. Id.
105. Id.
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ment than one who merely committed reckless or negligent homicide, even
though the harm caused is the same.' 0 6 Similarly, one who commits a crime
for compensation is more culpable than one who does not.'
In listing factors used to measure the gravity of an offense, the majority
omitted any consideration of the offender's past criminal record. Despite
its recognition that "prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing
decision,"' the Court focused primarily on the felony for which the defendant, Helm, received a life sentence.' 0 9 It is anomalous to weigh a sentence
imposed for a course of criminal conduct against only a portion of that
conduct. Prosecution under South Dakota's recidivist statute required Helm's
past crimes to be considered part of the "offense." Harsher penalties are
generally imposed on recidivists because their criminal records demonstrate
that they are neither reformed nor deterred by normal sanctions." 0 A
recidivist, such as Helm, is perceived as incorrigible and more blameworthy
than a first offender."' Thus, Helm's past crimes were logically an element
of culpability or blameworthiness, and they should have been included in
measuring the gravity of his offense.
Helm's past criminal convictions also could have been included in assessing the harm caused by his offense. Courts have rejected due process
challenges to recidivist statutes on the ground that no separate crime is
charged." ' Rather, these statutes have been interpreted as merely identifying aggravating circumstances that justify enhanced punishment for the principal offense." 3 Under this approach, Helm's past offenses would not be
fundamentally different from other aggravating circumstances, such as use
of a deadly weapon or commission of the offense for compensation.""
Harsher penalties are usually imposed when aggravating circumstances are
present because the potential harm to the victim and society is perceived
to be greater. Helm, and other offenders who have committed crimes in
the past, may present a greater threat to society and, therefore, deserve greater

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 3013 n.21.
109. Id.
110. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980).
111. As Chief Justice Burger noted, "Surely seven felony convictions warrant the conclusion
that respondent is incorrigible." Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3023 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
112. See Sherman v. United States, 241 F.2d 329, 335-36 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
911 (1957); Beland v. United States, 128 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 676
(1942).
113. See Goodman v. Kunkle, 72 F.2d 334, 336 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 619 (1934).
114. Some state criminal codes specifically include past convictions among aggravating circumstances to be considered when determining the length of a sentence. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 13A-5-48, 49(2) (1981) (prior conviction of another capital felony or a felony involving the
use of, or threat of, violence is relevant to determining sentence of defendant convicted of
capital offense); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2 (b)(1) (Supp. 1983) (longer sentence can
be imposed if defendant is convicted of a felony after having been previously convicted of
the same or a greater class felony).
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punishment. Past criminal conduct cannot be ignored completely in measuring the gravity of an offense.
The Helm Court balanced the gravity of the offense against the harshness
of the penalty as the initial step of its proportionality determination. The
majority, however, overlooked the relationship between recidivism and the
gravity of the offense. Furthermore, the Court overstated the relationship
between parole and the harshness of the penalty. When an offender is sentenced to prison with the possibility of parole, a court is faced with a choice
in measuring the harshness of the penalty. The length of time that such an
offender will spend in prison is not always determinable, as the offender
may obtain an early release. Although no choice was necessary in Helm,' 5
the Court intimated that the sentence would have been found less harsh had
parole been available. Yet, this approach is logically inconsistent with a requirement of proportionality in sentencing. If the possibility of parole is
made a factor in proportionality analysis, offenders might receive longer
sentences than they deserve.
There has been substantial disagreement among judges and commentators
over whether parole should be considered in proportionality analysis." I Some
consider it unrealistic to presume that an offender will serve his full
sentence."' Although an offender has no legally enforceable right to parole," 8
it is routinely granted in many jurisdictions. Others point out that parole
is merely a conditional release and is not to be equated with liberty. An
offender remains liable for the balance of his sentence'' and may be imprisoned again without benefit of trial for violating any conditions of his
parole.' 20 Furthermore, parole boards base their recommendations largely
115. Under South Dakota law, Helm was ineligible for parole unless his sentence was first
commuted to a term of years. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 24-15-4 (1979).
116. Several courts have favored including the possibility of parole in their proportionality
decisions. See Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624 F.2d 1363, 1368-69 (5th Cir. 1980); Carmona v.
Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 413-14 (2d Cir. 1978). Parole was considered in Rummel v. Estelle, although
the Court was not explicitly applying a proportionality analysis. 445 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1980).
Other courts, however, have found the appropriate measure of proportionality to be the maximum length of a challenged sentence. See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 419, 503 P.2d 921,
926, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 222 (1972); People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 111, 332 N.E.2d 338,
341, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 475, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 (1975). One writer reported that courts
consider the maximum sentence as the relevant punishment in proportionality analysis and
observed that the choice of presumptions with respect to whether the criminal will serve the
entire sentence will, in practice, be determinative of the proportionality issue. Note, Disproportionality, supra note 2, at 1129.
117. See Note, Disproportionality, supra note 2, at 1128-29.
118. Parole is generally viewed as a matter of legislative grace. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 280 (1980). See generally G. KILLINGER, H. KERPER & P. CROMWELL, JR., PROBATION
AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1976) (examination of various methods of

mitigating prison sentences in the United States).
119. See G. KILLINGER, H. KERPER & P. CROMWELL, JR., supra note 118, at 200-02; Note,

Disproportionality, supra note 2, at 1130.
120. G. KILLINOER, H. KERPER & P. CROMWELL, JR., supra note 118, at 281-87. A parolee
is, however, entitled to a hearing before revocation of parole. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 485-89 (1972).
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upon an offender's conduct subsequent to sentencing and incarceration. Consideration of the crime committed generally plays a minor role in parole
decisions. 2' Thus, there is a real possibility, ignored by the Helm Court,
that an offender could actually be required to serve a sentence that is
disproportionate to his crime, even though at the time of sentencing, the
likelihood of parole diminished the apparent harshness of the sentence and
rendered it proportional.
A court should always measure proportionality by the full sentence imposed, even when parole is available. Otherwise, the offender's right to proportionality in sentencing would not be guaranteed. 2 In Helm, the Court
was not required to decide whether the possibility of parole should be a
factor in measuring proportionality because parole was unavailable to Helm. 3
Nevertheless, the Court explicitly refused to overrule Rummel and distinguished it from Helm on the issue of parole.' 2 As a result, the Court implies that the likelihood of parole is an appropriate, perhaps even a necessary,
consideration in analyzing proportionality. Although both Helm and Rummel received sentences of life imprisonment, the Court viewed Rummel's
sentence as less harsh because of the possibility that he would be paroled. 2 '
It necessarily follows that if a case similar to Rummel were to arise, a sentence
of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole would be upheld. Such
a sentence would be constitutional, even though the offender might eventually serve the full sentence, and even though Helm held that life imprisonment is a disproportionate punishment for minor property offenses.' 26 Thus,
considering the possibility of parole in a proportionality analysis may thus
produce an incorrect result.
Another fundamental defect in the Helm decision is the Court's failure
to specify the intended relationship between the three prongs of its proportionality analysis.' 7 One possible interpretation is that each prong is an in121. See, Note, Disproportionality, supra note 2, at 1130. For example, the circumstances
of the present offense comprise only one of ten major factors in the parole selection process
outlined by the United States Board of Parole. G. KILLINGER, H. KERPER & P. CROMWELL,
JR., supra note 118, at 248-49.
122. See Note, Disproporionality, supra note 2, at 1130. One commentator has noted that:
The essence of the prohibition against undeserved punishment is the legal right of
the offender to be free from all restraints on his liberty after a period of time
proportional to the severity of his offense. . . . To condition the lawfulness of
a defendant's incarceration, therefore, on the chance of a reduced sentence or parole,
as the realists propose, would place a decision of constitutional dimensions within
the unreviewable discretion of correctional authorities.

Id.
123. 103 S. Ct. at 3005.
124. Id.at 3015-16. The Helm Court compared the "liberal" parole policy of Texas, rele-

vant in Rummel, to the South Dakota procedure under which the governor could commute
a life sentence, thereby making a prisoner eligible for parole but subject to the stringent requirements of the South Dakota parole system. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 3016.
127. The dissent questioned whether "all these factors [must] be present in order to hold

1983l

SOLEM v. HELM

dependent requirement under the eighth amendment. Alternatively, the test
could be viewed as balancing a number of factors, requiring consideration
of all the criteria as a whole. '28 This alternative interpretation is bolstered
by the Helm Court's characterization of its analysis as objective. Under the
second prong of the Helm test, the challenged sentence must be compared
with punishments imposed in the same jurisdiction for other crimes. Then,
under the third prong of the Helm test, the challenged sentence is compared
with sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime.' 29 These
comparisons produce an objective basis for analyzing proportionality' 30 and
distinguish the Helm test from the subjective "shock the conscience"
standard.
Nevertheless, the Helm Court applied its criteria sequentially, as though
each step were to be considered independently. 3 ' If this is the correct interpretation, then Helm requires two distinct types of proportionality in sentencing. Under this view of the Helm test, a court first determines whether,
standing alone, the punishment fits the crime. This analysis may be labeled
absolute proportionality; it lacks any frame of reference.'
Next, a court
determines whether the punishment imposed is comparable to punishments
authorized for similar crimes within the same jurisdiction. This analysis may
be labeled relative proportionality; it is viewed with reference to a state's
penological scheme as a whole. A rational theory of retribution, based upon
the concept that it is unfair to punish a person more than he deserves, would
include both absolute and relative proportionality. This concept of fairness
would be violated if one offender were punished more harshly than another
who was guilty of a similar or more serious offense.' 33
a sentence excessive under the Eighth Amendment" and, if so, "[hiow are they to be weighed
against each other?" Id. at 3022 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
128. Such an approach would be analogous to the "totality of conditions" doctrine the federal
courts have developed in cases challenging prison conditions under the cruel and unusual
punishments clause. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1139-40 (5th Cir. 1982) (in determining whether prison conditions violate eighth amendment, test to be applied is "totality of
circumstances"); Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1982) (court must consider
totality of conditions to determine if prison conditions violate eighth amendment); Dawson
v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1285 (D.W. Va. 1981) (courts often employ totality of conditions analysis when reviewing challenges to the overall conditions and practices at a prison or jail).
129. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
130. As stated by the court in State v. Mullalley, 127 Ariz. 92, 96, 618 P.2d 586, 590 (1980),
interjurisdictional comparisons provide "evidence of what sanctions are currently acceptable
in our society for the crime committed." See also supra note 101.
131. See 103 S. Ct. at 3012-15.
132. It seems impossible to make an objective determination of absolute proportionality without
comparing punishments imposed in other jurisdictions. Consequently, the first and third steps
of the test cannot be separated if Helm is read as rejecting a subjective, "shock the conscience" standard. Treating each step of the Helm test as a separate determination is, thus,
inconsistent with the Court's characterization of the test as objective.
133. For example, if X was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment for petty theft, while Y
was sentenced to only 5 years for the same or a similar crime, X would have been unfairly
punished. Similarly, if Z was sentenced to 30 years for murder, X would again have been
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Despite the logical arguments favoring relative proportionality, the Supreme
Court has generally limited its importance in eighth amendment analysis.
If a great disparity were found between punishments imposed for similar
crimes within a single jurisdiction, the Court has intimated that this alone
would support a finding of disproportionality.' 34 The Court, however, has
been unwilling to displace legislative judgments on the relative severity of
crimes, except when a lesser included offense is compared with the greater
offense.' 35 Even in this limited class of cases, the Court has not actually
required relative proportionality, and it has only required that the penalty
imposed for the included offense not be more severe than the sanction
authorized for the greater offense.' 36 Moreover, in Helm the sentence clearly was relatively disproportionate to the principal offense,' 37 yet the Court
appeared to rely on the disparity within the jurisdiction simply as an indication of absolute disproportionality.' 38 It therefore seems unreasonable to interpret Helm as requiring an independent finding of relative proportionality, without more explicit language to that effect.
Application of the Helm Test
Certain problems with the Helm decision arise more from the Court's application of its three-part test than from the test itself. The decision is incompatible with recent precedent and suffers from two critical infirmities.
First, the Helm Court failed to clarify the bounds of legitimate legislative
discretion and the appropriateness of judicial restraint. Second, Helm failed
to strike a decisive balance between a state's interest in imposing more severe
punishment upon recidivists, and the Constitution's requirement of proportionality in sentencing. The majority's attempts to resolve these infirmities
are confusing and inadequate. For example, the Court's distinction between
violent and nonviolent crimes contradicts its definition of gravity of an offense. Consequently, although Helm furnishes an objective test, it is unclear
how that test should be applied to eighth amendment challenges to prison
sentences.
unfairly punished because Z's crime was far more serious than X's. A logically consistent theory

of retribution requires that an offender be punished in accordance with the relative severity
of his crime. See Note, Disproportionality, supra note 2, at 1131-32.
134. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910).
135. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 973 (1977).
A lesser included offense is defined by its elements. If the state must prove A, B, and C to
obtain a conviction for crime 1, and it must prove A, B, C, and D to obtain a conviction
for crime 2, then crime 1 is a lesser included offense of crime 2. Thus, an attempted offense
is a lesser included offense of the completed crime. In Roberts v. Collins, simple assault was
held to be a lesser included offense of assault with intent to kill. Id. at 169-70.
136. See Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3011 (dicta).
137. The Helm Court's comparison of the punishments imposed in South Dakota indicated
that Helm's sentence was harsher than sentences authorized for many more serious crimes,
such as attempted murder or first-degree rape. Id. at 3013-14.
138. The Helm Court held that the sentence imposed was "significantly disproportionate"
and made no further distinction. Id. at 3016.
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Many court decisions involving different types of punishments have applied

a proportionality analysis similar to the three-part test enunciated in Helm. 39
The Helm decision, however, represents the first case in which the Supreme
Court concluded that the length of a prison sentence, by itself, violated the

cruel and unusual punishments clause. Case law supporting this result is sparse
for two reasons. First, until fairly recently, the eighth amendment was not
held applicable to the states,' ° thus preventing any challenge of state sentencing procedures on federal constitutional grounds.'" Second, the judiciary's
traditional deference to legislatively determined sentence lengths further
decreased the number of successful eighth amendment challenges.' 2 Such
deference seemed to be prudent in light of the Court's failure to provide
clear and objective criteria with which to review sentencing.

According to the Helm dissent, the fact that the majority's position was
unprecedented proved that no constitutional significance attached to the dif-

ference between the lengths of prison sentences for similar crimes.'" The
139. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958) (denationalization); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (cadena temporal)
(1910); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973) (life imprisonment).
140. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
141. Prior to Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court had intimated, but
had never explicitly held, that the eighth amendment restricted states' sentencing procedures.
See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878). State constitutional provisions prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments, however, have been relied upon to invalidate disproportionate prison sentences imposed pursuant to recidivist statutes. See State v. Fain, 94 Wash.
2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980); State v. Buck, _
W. Va. __,
294 S.E.2d 281 (1982); Wanstreet
v. Bordenkircher, __
W. Va.
., 276 S.E.2d 204 (1981). For discussions of proportionality
based on state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments, see Comment, The Eighth Amendment: Judicial Self-Restraint and Legislative Power, 65 MARQ. L.
REV. 434, 458-61 (1982); Note, Recidivist Statutes-Application of Proportionalityand Overbreadth Doctrines to Repeat Offenders-Wanstreetv. Bordenkircher, 57 WAsH. L. REv. 573 (1982).
142. The federal judicial power to review state sentencing statutes is constrained by two constitutional doctrines. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, which restricts all three branches
of the federal government, a court may lack authority to decide a question involving a matter
peculiarly within the province of the legislature. Under the doctrine of federalism, federal courts
are also incompetent to review certain state actions because the states retain their sovereignty
in all matters not constitutionally delegated to the federal government. U.S. CONST. amend.
X; see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17-18 (1978) (many disputes involve both
separation of powers and federalism concerns).
These two constitutional concerns produced a traditional policy of judicial restraint in cases
challenging the proportionality of prison sentences imposed under state statutes. See generally
Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3020-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Court typically has abstained from
proportionality review, applying it only in extraordinary cases). Determining the relative severity
of crimes and the appropriateness of punishments has been likened to arbitrary line-drawing
and, therefore, viewed as a decision for legislatures, rather than courts. See id. at 3019-20,
3022-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1980). Federal judicial review of state sentencing statutes is also thought
to be antithetical to a federal system because of the danger of "constitutionality imposed
uniformity." Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 282 (1980)); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373-74 n.2 (1982).
143. 103 S. Ct. at 3018-19.
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dissent argued that the line-drawing process involved in the majority's approach could not be accomplished objectively; moreover, it merely substituted
judges' subjective beliefs for legitimate legislative determinations.'" But the
Court has held that the cruel and unusual punishments clause "must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.'". Therefore, as society's views on appropriate punishment change, the Court can, and should, abandon inconsistent case law.
If society now perceives extremely long prison sentences as cruel and unusual
punishment for petty crimes, legislative imposition of such punishments is
parohibited by the eighth amendment.' 6
Cases decided long ago, when society's views were different,' 47 may have
lost much of their vitality and, as a result, may be considered inapplicable
today. Recently decided cases, however, cannot be explained away in a similar
manner. In Rummel and Davis, the Court explicitly rejected challenges to
prison sentences by declaring that the "length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.""'4 Yet, the Rummel and
Davis Courts neither engaged in any survey of contemporary societal attitudes toward lengthy prison sentences, nor explored the current acceptance
of excessive imprisonment. In both cases, the Court simply condoned previous
Supreme Court decisions that held that proportionality was inapplicable to
49
the length of prison sentences.'

144. Id. at 3017.
145. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 378 (1910) (eighth amendment standards progress as public opinion changes).
146. Society's views on the appropriateness of punishments can be determined by comparing
the punishments imposed in the various jurisdictions. Changes in moral values may alter these
views over time, even if the punishments remain the same. Imprisonment may be perceived
as harsher because prison conditions have worsened in comparison to the general standard of
living. In reality, prison conditions may actually have worsened. For example, severe prison
overcrowding is a problem in most states and may lead to increased personal danger to inmates. Changes in prison conditions could foster a change in society's attitudes toward punishment in general. Finally, better, more effective alternatives to imprisonment may now be available,
making lengthy prison sentences less acceptable. For example, the Governor's Task Force on
Prison Overcrowding in Illinois estimates that one third of those convicted of crimes were under
the influence of an illegal drug when they committed their offenses, and another third drank
heavily just before committing their offenses. Tybor, Task Force Studies Alternatives to Jail,
Chicago Tribune, Aug. 29, 1983, § 1, at 9, col. 4. Alcohol or drug abuse treatment may be
more beneficial for such offenders than imprisonment. Public attitudes concerning criminal
punishment have changed, whatever the reason, meriting judicial notice.
147. Punishments imposed over the past 200 years have changed markedly, indicating that
contemporary societal views differ from those of the framers' society. During the eighteenth
century, even trivial offenses were punishable by hanging or long imprisonment, thereby limiting
any recidivism problem. Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFFALO L.
RaV. 99 (1971). Today, the death penalty is reserved for the most serious offenses, and prison
sentences are generally shorter. If the Trop definition of cruel and unusual punishments is
accepted, then the debate over the framers' intent and lack of case law is irrelevant; anything
presently unacceptable to society is prohibited.
148. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980).
149. See Davis, 454 U.S. at 372-73; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272-75.
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If contemporary society finds lengthy imprisonment to be a cruel and
unusual punishment for a petty crime, then legislatures are not free to impose such a penalty. The Rummel and Davis decisions, therefore, exhibit inappropriate judicial restraint. Refusing to exercise such restraint, the Helm
Court correctly adopted a new approach to eighth amendment challenges
of prison sentences. Because the eighth amendment prohibits the imposition
of disproportionate sentences, the length of prison sentences can no longer
be purely a matter of legislative discretion. By invalidating statutes that impose excessive penalties, a court is not interfering with legitimate legislative
decision making. Rather, that court is simply enforcing the Constitution and
preventing legislatures from usurping power.
If the Rummel and Davis rationale is based upon an erroneous perception
of current societal attitudes, it should not be viewed as controlling. The Helm
Court, though, refused to abandon completely the judicial restraint espoused
by Rummel and Davis, insisting that it did not endorse unfettered appellate
review of prison sentences. Helm establishes only a limited power of judicial
review and courts should continue to grant "substantial deference" to "the
broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types
and limits of punishments for crimes. . . . "'I Nevertheless, the Helm Court's
application of its own analysis does not display much deference to the South
Dakota legislature. On the contrary, by examining neither the purpose nor
the rationale for the legislature's determination, the Court appeared to arrive at its own independent conclusion of the propriety of Helm's sentence. '
Consequently, lower courts are left with virtually no guidance as to the
legislative bounds of legislative discretion and the proper limits of judicial
review of prison sentences challenged under the eighth amendment.
By refusing to overrule Rummel, the Helm Court also created considerable
confusion regarding the question of enhanced punishment for recidivists. The
facts of Rummel and Helm were similar in most respects;' 5 the only significant difference between the two cases was the availability of parole. The
decision in Rummel, however, rested primarily upon a state's substantial interest in punishing recidivists, and not upon the existence of parole.' 53
Although it noted that this state interest was "justified" and should not
be ignored,'"" the Helm Court completely disregarded it when weighing the

150. 103 S. Ct. at 3009.
151. Some writers have maintained that an examination of the legislative purpose of a sentencing statute is not appropriate in a proportionality analysis. See supra note 98.
152. Helm's last felony involved passing a "no account" check for $100. Helm, 103 S. Ct.
at 3005. The last felony committed by Rummel involved obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266. Thus, the principal felony in each case was a minor property offense. Both defendants had been convicted of other felonies against property, although Rummel had fewer convictions than Helm. Neither had been convicted of any crime involving a
direct threat of harm to a person. Both had received life sentences under statutes authorizing
such penalties for recidivists. See Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3017-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
153. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 276, 284-85.
154. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3013.
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crimes against the punishment.51 This significant departure from precedent
was explained in a footnote: "We must focus on the principal felony-the
felony that triggers the life sentence-since Helm has already paid the penalty
for each of his prior offenses."' 6 This statement effectively overruled a series
of cases, culminating with Rummel, that recognized a state's right to consider an offender's prior criminal conduct and to punish more harshly those
persons who had demonstrated that they were incorrigible.' 7
Standing alone, this statement might also completely undermine all recidivist
statutes.' 8 Unfortunately, Helm is internally inconsistent as to the relevance
of prior convictions in a proportionality analysis, so it is unclear whether
such undermining was intended. The Helm Court acknowledged that a
recidivist, because of his criminal record, could be punished more severely
than a first offender.' 9 At the same time, the Court declared that it would
not consider Helm's prior crimes in reviewing the length of his sentence
because those crimes were "relatively minor." 6 ' Thus, in applying the first
prong of its test, the Helm Court failed to adhere to its articulated standard. Despite the Court's acknowledgment that an offender's criminal record
should be "relevant," ' ' it did not actually consider Helm's prior offenses
in determining the gravity of his crime. Yet, when the majority compared
other crimes and punishments in the second and third prongs of its test,
Helm's recidivist status was taken into account.' 62 The Court did not compare Helm's sentence to other states' penalties for issuing a "no account"
check; his sentence was compared to other states' penalties for committing
seven nonviolent felonies.' 63 This internal inconsistency may indicate either
155. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
156. 103 S. Ct. at 3013 n.21.
157. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284. The Supreme Court upheld state recidivist statutes challenged
under the eighth amendment in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); Oyler v. Boles, 368
U.S. 448 (1962); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts,
180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895). Broad prosecutorial discretion
in deciding whether to invoke a recidivist statute was upheld in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357 (1978).
158. By definition, prior offenses are necessarily considered under a recidivist statute. See
supra note 4. A defendant usually has already paid the penalties for his prior offenses, and
recidivist statutes typically require that the convictions arise from separate and distinct criminal
episodes; many states also require that a subsequent felony be committed after a conviction
for the preceding offense. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101 (1973 & Supp. 1982); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 33B-1, 1005-5-3 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-7.0, -7.2 (1981). Some
states require the defendant to have been sentenced for a prior offense before commission of
the subsequent felony. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.04-.10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-84);
S.C. CODE AN. § 17-25-45 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983). A defendant, therefore, cannot be
prosecuted under the typical recidivist statute unless he has already paid the penalty for his
prior offenses.
159. 103 S. Ct. at 3013.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 3013 n.21. Helm's prior offenses should logically have been considered in the
first step of the test. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
162. 103 S. Ct. at 3013-15.
163. Id. at 3014-15.
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disagreement or confusion among members of the Court as to the validity
of recidivist statutes.
The Helm Court's application of its own test is confusing and inconsistent. In considering the relevance of Helm's prior offenses, the Court drew
a distinction between violent and nonviolent crimes.164 Helm's prior offenses
were labeled "relatively minor" criminal conduct because none of them involved a threat to a person.' 65 The implication is clear: had Helm been
previously convicted of violent crimes, the Court would have accorded a
66
greater weight to those convictions in its proportionality analysis.
Although it emphasized that the proportionality of prison sentences must
be reviewed objectively, the Helm Court's definition of "relatively minor"
crimes was based on only one objective factor: the absence of physical
violence. While Helm's most recent offense involved a small amount of
money, not all of his other equally minor prior offenses could be similarly
quantified.' 6 7 The Court noted that Helm was an alcoholic, but it is difficult to understand how this could have mitigated the seriousness of his
offenses since intoxication does not usually excuse crime.' 6 Finally, the conclusion that Helm was "not a professional criminal"'6 9 was inadequately
substantiated and, in any event, was not particularly relevant to the severity
of the crimes he had committed. Consequently, it appears that the only objective reason for ignoring Helm's prior offenses was their nonviolent nature.
If Helm mandates a distinction between violent and nonviolent crimes,
then a significant limitation is placed upon the three-step proportionality test.
Violent crimes must always be considered more serious when measuring the
gravity of the offense. Yet, as the Helm dissent correctly observed, "the
absence of violence does not always affect the strength of society's interest
in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a particular individual."' 76
Some crimes commonly designated as property offenses, such as burglary
and arson, often involve significant risk of harm to persons. Other crimes
involving no use of force, such as criminal conspiracy, prostitution, and
narcotics trafficking, may cause substantial and widespread harm to society.
164. Id. at 3013.
165. Id. The dissent disagreed on this point and noted that Helm had been convicted of
three burglaries and was convicted three times of drunk driving. Id. at 3017 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
166. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has adopted this approach in reviewing
challenges to the state recidivist statute, brought under the state cruel and unusual punishments
clause. State v. Beck, W. Va. -, -,
286 S.E.2d 234, 244 (1981); Wanstreet v.
Bordenkircher, __
W. Va. -,
, 276 S.E.2d 205, 214 (1981).
167. In Rummel, on the other hand, each of the crimes could be viewed in terms of the
dollars involved. 445 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1980).
168. 103 S. Ct. at 3013 n.22. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at 341-51
(discussing when intoxication is a defense).
169. 103 S. Ct. at 3013 n.22.
170. Id. at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275
(1980)). The Helm dissent misquoted the Rummel opinion, which used the word criminal rather
than individual.
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A rigid distinction between violent and nonviolent crimes would require simple
assault to be termed more severe than any of these nonviolent, but nonetheless
serious, crimes. Under such a distinction, the gravity of the offense would
not consistently be determined by the harm caused or by the offender's
culpability.' 7'
The Helm Court announced specific, objective criteria for determining
whether a prison sentence is disproportionate to a crime. These criteria,
however, are inadequately defined and were inconsistently applied in Helm.
The Court indicated that Helm's prior offenses could be ignored because
they were nonviolent, but this distinction between violent and nonviolent
crimes confuses a determination of the gravity of the offense. The Helm
Court also undermined its own requirement of proportionality in sentencing
by implicitly endorsing a consideration of the availability of parole. Furthermore, the Court did not clearly indicate whether the eighth amendment
requires both absolute and relative proportionality. Finally, by explicitly refusing to overrule Rummel and Davis, the Helm Court created further confusion concerning the bounds of legislative discretion and the validity of
recidivist statutes.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE HELM DECISION

The Helm decision is likely to have a substantial and immediate effect
on both the sentencing of recidivists and on appellate court review of state
recidivist statutes. The Helm dissent predicted an increased number of sentencing appeals'7 . and feared that the majority's three-part test would result

in a "constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of
federalism. ..

7'""

Yet, the most serious repercussion of the Helm decision

is the uncertain future it creates for most state recidivist statutes.
Although the Helm Court acknowledged a state's right to punish a recidivist
more severely than a first offender,' 7' the Court's application of its proportionality test completely disregarded this valid state interest. By distinguishing
violent from nonviolent crimes, Helm implies that past crimes should not
be considered unless they were violent.' 3 Helm also instructs courts to "focus
on the principal offense" because presumably the defendant already has been
punished for the prior offenses.' 76 By employing an approach in which reviewing courts ignore a recidivist's criminal record, the Helm Court has all but
overruled most recidivist statutes.
Most state recidivist statutes do not conform to the requirements announced
in Helm.' 7 While many of these statutes permit courts to consider the prin-

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
103 S. Ct. at 3022 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 3019 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282 (1980)).
Id. at 3013.
Id.
Id. at 3013 n.21.
See infra Statutory Appendix.
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cipal offense in determining the appropriate sentence, 7 8 it is normally only

one of several factors in the sentencing decision.

"

Typically, the number

and type of prior crimes are equally important concerns. 8 0 A history of

violent criminal conduct will often weigh more heavily than "relatively minor"
offenses, but the vast majority of states do not limit their recidivist laws
to violent felons.' 8' The Helm Court's interpretation of its proportionality

test apparently requires sentencing courts to ignore all prior nonviolent crimes,
even though most recidivists do not commit violent felonies' 82 and many
178. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1979 & Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFED LAWS
ANN. § 22-7-7 (1979). The principal offense may be construed in varying ways to ascertain
the length of a sentence. In some states, the principal felony calls for a basic sentence plus
an additional term because of the criminal history. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8
(Burns 1979 & Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (Supp. 1983). Another common approach imposes the sentence authorized for felonies that are one or more classes higher than
the principal felony. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-7-7 (1979). Recidivist statutes
often are inapplicable when a fixed sentence is imposed regardless of the principal offense,
and a greater penalty would otherwise be authorized. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.010
(1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.1, -7.2 (1981). Finally, a recidivist statute may enumerate particular offenses such as kidnapping or armed robbery. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9714 (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
179. Indeed, a recidivist statute, by definition, requires a court to consider the past crimes
as well as the principal offense. See supra notes 4 & 158.
180. Some states employ what might be called a stepped approach: as the number of convictions increases, the additional authorized punishment multiplies. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 22-7-7 to -8 (1979 & Supp. 1982). An alternative approach is to consider the type
and number of prior offenses as a whole: a few violent crimes would weigh as heavily as
several less serious crimes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667-667.7 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 558.016-.018 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1983).
181. Only Pennsylvania limits its recidivist law to violent criminals. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9714 (Purdon 1982).
182. The most exhaustive study of recidivists and their characteristics is found in D. WEST,
THE HABITUAL PRISOrER (1963). West conducted interviews with two groups of recidivists: 50

"preventive detainees" (similar to Helm) and 50 "intermittent recidivists" (men who had substantial lapses of honesty). Very few of the men in either group were convicted of violent crimes.
"Contrary to the popular stereotype of a persistent criminal, few of these prisoners were prone
to violence and hardly any were efficiently organized, professional criminals. The majority were
shiftless, work-shy characters for whom petty stealing represented the line of least resistance."
Id. at 100. West found that only eight of the fifty preventive detainees had been convicted
for violent crimes, and only one of this group had ever inflicted serious injury. Id. at 13.
Charges for sexual offenses, in both groups, accounted for only three percent of the convictions, and none of these sexual offenses was accompanied by serious physical violence. Id.
at 14. "Contrary to what one might expect, both groups of prisoners, but especially the preventive
detainees, included a substantial number of habitually petty thieves and very few enterprising
swindlers on a grand scale. Most of their crimes seemed to have been undertaken for the sake
of rather trivial loot, and carried out without previous organisation or planning and without
the aid of accomplices." Id. at 15. Indeed, West preferred the term "habitual prisoner" to
the more common "habitual criminal" because "the determined professional criminal, however
persistent his antisocial activities, rarely sinks to the status of a habitual prisoner." Id. at ix.
Since long prison sentences typically are imposed for crimes involving serious physical violence,
the majority of recidivists would logically be petty thieves, and not dangerous and violent
criminals. Murderers and rapists, for example, normally receive the harshest sentences. Obviously, death or life imprisonment limits an offender's opportunities to commit further crimes.
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serious crimes involve no violence.' 8 3 It seems unlikely that these facts could
validate recidivist statutes that otherwise fail to survive the Helm proportionality test, because the legislative purpose in enacting a particular recidivist
statute is not considered under that approach."'
85
Another consequence of the Helm decision, recognized by the dissent,'
will be a marked increase in the number of prison sentence appeals. Under
Rummel and Davis, judicial review of a sentencing statute was appropriate
86
only if the appellant claimed that the law was unconstitutional on its face.'
Thus, a sentencing statute was invalid only if, under any conceivable set
of circumstances, reasonable people could not disagree as to the inappropriateness of the mandated penalty.' 87 In contrast, proportionality
challenges under the Helm standard will be heard on a case-by-case basis.
The particular sentence imposed for the particular crime will be examined,
and a facially valid statute may be found invalid as applied in an individual
case.' 88 Of course, as the Helm Court observed, successful appeals from noncapital punishments on grounds of disproportionality will be "exceedingly
rare."' 89 Nevertheless, the most extreme cases will now be seriously considered, and virtually all cases may be heard, even if the statute is not unconstitutional on its face.
Because courts now must consider each case on its individual facts, it is
likely that offenders will be encouraged to appeal their sentences. Case-bycase analysis of proportionality is desirable despite the concomitant increase
in the number of appeals; under such an approach, an individual offender's
constitutional rights are better ensured. Unfortunately, an unnecessarily large
increase in the number of appeals will result from the ambiguities and inconsistencies that complicate the Helm decision.' 90 As district courts strugAside from serving shorter prison sentences, petty thieves can actually profit from their crimes.
The astute criminal is more likely to commit crimes that produce income, particularly if the
danger of failure is superficial (few prosecutions, short sentences, or both). West's findings
tend to support this theory. See generally D. WEST, supra.
183. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 98 & 117-18 and accompanying text. The Helm Court did not apply
the rational basis test, or any similar test, to the South Dakota statute. Without considering
the legislative purpose, the Court came to an independent conclusion as to the appropriateness
of Helm's sentence.
185. 103 S. Ct. at 3022 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
186. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 377 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.'263, 274
n.ll (1980).
187. See 103 S. Ct. at 3020 n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
188. The South Dakota statute would probably have been valid if the defendant had a history
of violent crimes. The statute was not facially unconstitutional, but it was worded too broadly
and authorized the application of an unfair sentence in Helm's case. The Supreme Court could
have concluded that the statute was overly broad, or that the trial court abused its discretion
in imposing Helm's penalty. Although life imprisonment was not required by the statute, the
trial court chose a life sentence as Helm's punishment. The Court did not specify which of
these two conclusions it had drawn.
189. 103 S. Ct. at 3009 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 279 (1980)).
190. For example, the Helm Court's definition of "gravity of the offense" is inconsistent
with its application of the test's first step. See supra notes 103-04, 170-71 and accompanying
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gle to apply the Helm proportionality test to particular sets of facts, inconsistent decisions will result. Even if statutes are invalidated intermittently,
the Helm dissent's fear that "this holding will flood the appellate courts
with cases in which ... arbitrary lines must be drawn""' is not unfounded.
Eventually, the Supreme Court will need to resolve varying interpretations
of Helm's proportionality test.
The Helm dissent was apparently less troubled by the decision's potentially adverse impact on appellate court dockets, than it was by the supposed
demise of federalism and states' rights. The dissent maintained that comparisons between jurisdictions, as required by the third prong of the Helm
test, were impracticable because sentencing statutes and parole systems vary
widely among the states.' 92 Furthermore, the dissent continued, interstate
comparisons would "trample on fundamental concepts of federalism."' 9 3
Consequently, the dissent asserted that the majority's interpretation of the
eighth amendment was incompatible with the federalist system established
94
by the Constitution to encourage diversity and experimentation.
The Helm dissent supported its contention by observing that the same conduct may produce substantially different consequences in two states, because
of differences in local conditions. 9 ' A proper application of the Helm test,
however, provides the solution to the very problem the dissent purports to
raise. For purposes of comparison, identical conduct cannot fairly be
categorized as the same crime because the gravity of the particular offense
may differ between jurisdictions. 91 6 A greater punishment in one state would be
text. The Court also vacillated on the question of how prior convictions should be considered
in sentencing recidivists. See supra notes 108-14, 152-63 and accompanying text.
191. 103 S. Ct. at 3022 (Burger, C.J. dissenting).
192. Id. at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
193. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
194. This view of federalism has previously been rejected by the Court as a rationale for
limiting the scope of judicial review. The eighth amendment limits state action, and states are
not free to infringe individual liberties in the name of experimentation with social goals. See,
e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592 (1977) (punishment may be unconstitutional even if
it serves legitimate goals); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 663-64 (1962) (eighth amendment constrains state's valid authority to combat drug traffic).
195. The Helm dissent posed the following hypothetical: "Different states surely may view
particular crimes as more or less severe than other states. Stealing a horse in Texas may have
different consequences and warrant different punishment than stealing a horse in Rhode Island
or Washington, D.C ..
" 103 S. Ct. at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In the dissent's
view, the difference in punishment would be justified and constitutionally permissible because,
"[aibsent a constitutionally imposed uniformity ... some State will always bear the distinction
of treating particular offenders more severely than any other State." Id. In addition, different
areas may have significantly different crime rates. An area with a particularly high rate of
drug trafficking may have a greater interest in deterring that activity or may have more trouble
prosecuting offenders. Arguably, that jurisdiction would be justified in imposing more stringent
penalties for drug-related crimes.
196. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 53 Md. App. 171, 193, 452 A.2d 1234, 1245 (1982) (the
proportionality of a sentence is measured not by comparing the sentence with the label given
the crime, but by comparing the sentence with the criminal's behavior and the consequences
of his act).
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justified by more serious consequences suffered in that locale. Even though
the third prong of the test, which requires interjurisdictional comparisons,
may reveal a substantial disparity in punishments, an evaluation of the gravity
of the offense, as required by the first prong of the test, will provide a
justification for the disparity.
Uniform sentencing standards will not result from application of the Helm
test. As in any adversarial proceeding, a state will always be permitted to
respond to an offender's challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence.
If the disparity between states can be justified as a response to local needs,
or as a legitimate difference of legislative opinion, a court is likely to reject
the offender's eighth amendment claim.' 97
The Supreme Court must further clarify its position on recidivism and
the eighth amendment. The constitutionality of most recidivist statutes is
questionable after Helm. Other problems with the Helm decision are likely
to produce confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts, which may lead
to a marked increase in the number of prison sentences appealed. Until further clarified by the Supreme Court, the utility of the Helm test will be
limited.
CONCLUSION

In Solem v. Helm, the Court explicitly adopted an objective test for determining whether a prison sentence is, disproportionate to the crime for which
it is imposed. In the past, lower courts had employed a similar test, and
prior Supreme Court decisions had implicitly approved the three-part analysis.
The Helm Court's articulation and application of its criteria, however, are
not entirely consistent, particularly on the question of sentencing under
recidivist statutes. Further, though Rummel and Davis seem to be completely incompatible with Helm, the Court refused to overrule either of these
recent decisions. As a result, both the validity of recidivist statutes and the
scope of legislative discretion under the cruel and unusual punishments clause
are unclear. Helm is likely to produce substantial litigation, but, due to its
ambiguities and inconsistencies, the decision actually provides little guidance
for the lower courts.
Mary K. Bentley
197. See Note, Disproportionality,supra note 2, at 1135-36. The Helm majority indicated
that substantial deference should be granted legislative findings. 103 S. Ct. at 3009.
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STATUTORY APPENDIX
Prior offenses
A-Statute applies only to violent felonies
B- Statutes applies only to serious felonies, which include some nonviolent felonies
C-Statute applies to all felonies

KEY:

Principal offense
D-Principal offense affects sentence length
E-Principal offense does not affect sentence length
Discretion as to sentence length
F-Length of sentence is mandatory
G-Length of sentence is discretionary

STATE

CHARACTERISTICS

Alabama

C,D,F/G*

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
§§ 13A-5-6 to -10 (1982).
* Mandatory life without parole if a fourth felony conviction is a Class
A felony; mandatory life if fourth conviction is a Class B felony; sentence
discretionary for all others.

Alaska

C,D,G

ALA. CODE

ALASKA

STAT.

§§ 12.55.125, .155

(1980).
Arizona
*

C*,D,G

ARIZ.

REV. STAT.

ANN.

§ 13-604

(1956).
Applies to some misdemeanors as well.

Arkansas

C,D,G

California

B,D*,F**

Colorado

B/C*,D,F/G**

ARK. STAT. ANN.
-1004 (1947).

§§ 41-1001 to

CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667-667.7
(West 1970 & Supp. 1983).
* Violent offenses punished more harshly than nonviolent.
** Mandatory life for violent recidivists; mandatory enhancement of normal sentences for other recidivists.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101
(1978 & Supp. 1982).
* Applies to felonies punishable by 5 or more years on a third conviction; all felonies on fourth conviction.
** 25-50 years on third conviction; natural life on fourth conviction unless
death otherwise authorized.
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Connecticut

CHARACTERISTICS

[Vol. 33:149

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

C*,D,G,

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40
(West 1972 & Supp. 1983).
* Connecticut defines four different types of "persistent offenders"
dependent upon types of offenses committed.
Delaware
*

C,D/E,F/G*

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4214,
4215 (1974).
On a third conviction for one of several enumerated violent felonies,

court must impose life without parole; otherwise, life is merely authorized
on a fourth felony conviction.
District of
Columbia
C,E,G*
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-104A (1981).
* Any greater sentence may be imposed up to and including natural life.
Florida
*

C*,D,G**

FLA.

STAT.

ANN.

§

775.084

(West 1976 & Supp. 1983).
Applies to misdemeanors under some circumstances.
Maximum sentences provided.

**

Georgia

C,D,F*

Hawaii

B*,D,G**

GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2511 (1978
& Supp. 1982).
* Upon second felony conviction, maximum sentence authorized for
principal offense is mandatory; upon fourth felony conviction, maximum
without parole is mandatory.

*
**

Offenses enumerated.
Mandatory minimum sentences without parole.

Idaho
C,E,G*
* Minimum five years.
Illinois
*

HAWAII REV. STAT. § 706-606.5
(1976 & Supp. 1982).

IDAHO CODE § 19-2514 (1979).

B,D,F/G*

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 33B-1,
1005-5-3 (1981).
Natural life mandatory for third conviction of Class X felony; man-

datory minimums for other recidivists.
Indiana

C,E*,G*

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8
(Burns 1979 & Supp. 1983).
* Additional term, not dependent upon principal offense, added to normal sentence. Mandatory 30 years unless more than ten years have elapsed
since last conviction, otherwise 5-30 years.
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CHARACTERISTICS

STAT(JTORY PROVISIONS
Iowa
B*,E,G**
IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 321.555,
902.8 (West. 1979 & Supp. 1983).
* Applies to Class C and D felonies (including some serious violent and
nonviolent felonies) and to certain motor vehicle offenses. Excludes most
serious felonies involving danger to human life.
** Mandatory minimum sentence.

Kansas

C,D,G

§ 21-4504 (1981

KAN. STAT. ANN.

& Supp. 1982).
Kentucky

C,D,G

Ky.

REV.

STAT.

ANN.

§ 532.080

1975

& Supp.

(Bobbs-Merrill
1982).
Louisiana

C,D,G

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

15.529.1

(West 1981 & Supp. 1983).
Maine

ME.

REV.

STAT.

ANN.

tit.

29,

§§ 2291-2299 (Supp. 1982).
Applies only to motor vehicle offenses.
Maryland

MD. ANN.

art. 27, §§ 366,

CODE

474, 522 (1957).
No comprehensive recidivist statute; enhanced punishment authorized
for second or subsequent convictions of certain crimes.

Massachusetts

C*,D,F**

MASS.

ANN.

LAWS

ch. 279, § 25

(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980).

Michigan

C,D,G

MICH. COMp. LAWS

.11, .12, .14
Supp. 1982).

Minnesota

MINN.

STAT.

ANN. §§ 769.10,
(West 1968 &

ANN.

§ 609.155

(West 1964)
Repealed effective 1980.

Mississippi

C,D,F*

Missouri

C,D,G*

Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-81,
-83 (Supp. 1983).
* Mandatory maximum authorized for principal offense; mandatory life
if any violent offense; no parole.

Mo.

ANN.

STAT.

§§ 558.016, .018

(Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1983).
* Missouri divides recidivists according to number and type of offenses
committed. Those previously convicted of certain sexual offenses or presently
convicted of violent felonies receive longer sentences.
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CHARACTERISTICS

Montana

C,E,G
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS
MONT.

CODE ANN.

§§ 46-18-501,

-502 (1981).

Nebraska

C,E*,G

NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 29-2221 (1979).

Fixed term regardless of principal felony.
* Except that if a greater punishment is otherwise authorized for the
principal offense, the recidivist provision is expressly inapplicable.

Nevada

C*,E**,F/G***

NEV.

REV. STAT.

§ 207.010 (1981).

* Also applies to nonfelonies of which fraud or intent to defraud is
an element, and to petit larceny.
** Section not applicable if it would decrease the punishment otherwise
authorized for the principal offense.
*** Length of sentence discretionary upon third conviction; mandatory
life upon fourth conviction, but parole discretionary.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.6
(Supp. 1983).
Extended terms may be imposed if defendant has knowingly devoted

New Hampshire
*

C*,D,G

N.H.

himself to criminal activity as a major source of livelihood; or if defendant
has been imprisoned twice previously for more than a year.
New Jersey
*

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 2C 43-7, 44-3

(West 1982).
Statute refers to previous "crimes," not limited to felonies.

New Mexico
*

C*,D,G

C,D*,F*

N.M.

STAT.

ANN.

§ 31-18-17

(Supp. 1983).
Mandatory additional imprisonment, added to basic sentence for prin-

cipal felony.

New York

*

C*,D*,G

N.Y.

PENAL

LAW

§§ 70.04, .06,

.08, .10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1982).
Separate provisions for violent and nonviolent recidivists.

GEN. STAT. §§ 14-7.1, -7.2
(1981).
* Must be sentenced as Class C felon unless life sentence or death penalty
otherwise authorized.
** Mandatory minimum sentence.

North Carolina

N.C.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-.32-09
(1976 & Supp. 1981).
Considers both number and type of prior offenses; if crimes more

North Dakota
*

C,E*,G**

B*,D,G

serious, fewer prior convictions required.
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STATE

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

CHARACTERISTICS

§ 2929.12
(Page 1982 & Supp. 1982).
Statute establishes factors to be considered in setting sentence length.
If defendant is a "repeat or dangerous offender" (not defined within statute),
court shall consider imposing a longer term of imprisonment.
Ohio

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 51-54
(West 1983).
* Applies to crimes punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, to
attempts to commit such crimes, and to petit larceny.

Oklahoma

C*,D,G

Oregon

C*,D*,G

OR. REV.

161.725 (1981).

STAT. §

* Previous convictions relevant when principal felony seriously endangered another's life or safety, other factors.
Pennsylvania

A,D*,F/G**

42

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 9714

(Purdon 1982).

*
**

Statute limited to certain crimes as principal felony.
Mandatory minimum sentence; mandatory life on second homicide.

Rhode Island
*

C,D*,G

R.I.

GEN.

LAWS

§ 12-19-21 (1956

& Supp. 1983).
A term of up to 25 years is imposed in addition to sentence for prin-

cipal felony.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1983).
Three or more convictions from among an enumerated set of serious

South Carolina
*

B*,D*,G**

crimes.
** Mandatory life.

South Dakota

C,D*F/G*

S.D.

CODIFIED

§§ 22-7-7, -8
1983).

LAWS

ANN.

(1979 & Supp.

* Where only one or two prior felony convictions, sentence as next
higher class felony. Where three or more prior felony convictions, sentence

as Class 1 (life).

Tennessee

C*,E,G**

TENN.

CODE ANN.

§§ 39-1-801,

-802 (1982).
* Three or more prior convictions; at least two must have been from
among an enumerated set of felonies, petit larceny specifically excluded.
** Mandatory life without parole.
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Utah

CHARACTERISTICS
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS

TEx. PENAL CODE ANNr. § 12.42
(Vernon 1974).
Separate provision (§ 12.43) covers habitual misdemeanor offenders.
C*,D,G

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-1001
(1978).
At least one prior conviction for a felony second degree or greater.
Principal felony must be second degree or greater, murder excluded.
C*,E**,G

*
**

Vermont
C*,E**,G
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (1974).
* Felonies or attempts to commit felonies.
**

Murder excluded.

Virginia

VA. CODE §§ 19.2-297, 46.1-387.1
to -387.8 (1950 & Supp. 1983).
Applies only to petit larceny and motor vehicle offenses.

Washington
*

C*,E,G**

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§§ 9.92.090

to .100, 9.95.040 (1977).
Any crime of which fraud or intent to defraud is an element, petit

larceny, or any felony.
** Sterilization is authorized as an additional penalty.
West Virginia

C*,D,F**

W. VA. CODE §§ 61-11-18, -20, -21
(1977).

Also petit larceny.
** One year term for subsequent conviction of petit larceny; five year
additional penalty for felony.
*

WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.62 (West
1982).
* One felony or three misdemeanor convictions within five years
preceding commission of principal offense.

Wisconsin

C*,D,G

Wyoming

C,D*,F/G**

*

WYo.

STAT.

§§ 6-10-201, -202 (1983).

Principal offense must be a violent felony.

Ten to fifty years if two prior convictions; life if three prior
convictions.
**

